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Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in 
the Charging Function 
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN* 
A prosecutor's charging decision is the heart of the prosecution function. The charging 
decision involves an extraordinary exercise of discretionary power that is unreviewable. 
As a result, the decision is difficult to guide except in the broadest terms. The proposed 
revisions to the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function 
attempt to address several key issues that inform the charging decision, by broadening 
the language of several provisions of the current Standards as well as adding several 
new provisions. To be sure, the proposed Standards significantly change the current 
Standards with respect to the proper factors and considerations affecting a prosecutor's 
charging decision. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether these Standards purport to 
establish ethical guidelines for prosecution, or merely guidelines for a prosecutor's 
exercise of judgment and policy in the charging function. This Article assesses the 
extent to which the pt:oposed Standards cover several charging issues effectively, 
inadequately, or at all. Specifically, this Article focuses on (I) the retention and 
modification of the probable cause standard for filing charges; (2) the differing 
Standards for filing and maintaining charges; (3) the role of innocence in the charging 
decision; (4) discretionary factors in the charging decision; (5) improper considerations 
in the charging decision; (6) the role of race and community pressure; (7) the issue of 
filing multiple charges-so-called "overcharging" -and (8) the Standard for actions 
premised on a defendant's agreement not to sue. 
* Professor of Law, Pace Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A prosecutor's charging decision is the heart of the prosecution 
function. Three features of the charging decision stand out. First, the 
prosecutor's charging decision involves an enormous exercise of power-
described by Justice Robert H. Jackson as "the most dangerous power of 
the prosecutor."l Second, that power is virtually unreviewable.2 Third, 
the charging decision is an exercise of discretion that involves so many 
factors and considerations that it cannot be reduced to a simple formula. 
It is therefore difficult to design professional standards to guide a 
prosecutor's charging function except in the broadest terms. 
I. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 
(1940). 
2. See Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1¢7) (Burger, J.) ("Few subjects 
are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in deciding when 
and whether to institute criminal proceedings .... "). 
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The current ABA Criminal Justice Standard 3-3.9, described below, 
attempts to address several key issues that inform the charging decision.3 
The proposed revisions to the Standards by the Task Force ,4 also 
described below, change this approach by dividing the charging function 
into two separate standards: Standard 3-5.5 and Standard 3-5.6.5 The 
proposed Standards amplify the current Standard by broadening the 
language in several of the provisions and adding several new provisions. 
Thus, proposed Standard 3-5.5 focuses on the appropriate standard a 
prosecutor should apply in deciding whether to file and maintain criminal 
charges.6 Proposed Standard 3-5.6 focuses on several of the discretionary 
factors that a prosecutor should consider in making that decision, as well 
as some of the recurring issues that influence the exercise of discretion.7 
It is unclear whether these charging Standards purport to establish 
ethical guidelines for prosecution, or merely guidelines for a prosecutor's 
exercise of judgment and policy in the charging function. If the Task 
Force intended to establish ethical rules for the charging function, it 
probably should have cross-referenced the charging Standards with 
3. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993). 
4. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION (Proposed Revisions 2009).The 
Task Force, composed of prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and academics, recently completed a 
draft of revised sets of Standards for consideration by the ABA Criminal Justice Section Standards 
Committee. After completing its work, the Standards Committee will present its proposed revisions to 
the Criminal Justice Section Council for consideration, debate,,revisions, and approval. See generally 
Rory K. Little, The A,PA's Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and 
Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. I II I (20II) (describing the process); Martin Marcus, The Making 
of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of Excellence, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2009, at 10 
(same). 
5. Id. §§ 3-5.5, 3-5.6. The Task Force's rationale in separating the current Standard into two 
separate proposed Standards is unstated. Perhaps the Task Force believed that the separation would 
promote clarity and consistency. To be sure, proposed Standard 3-3.5 focuses mostly on the 
prosecutor's mental state in filing and maintaining charges, whereas proposed Standard 3-3.6 identifies 
several discretionary factors in charging. Id. However, although the two proposed Standards broaden 
the language in the current Standard in several respects, there are several provisions in the proposed 
Standards that appear to overlap with each other and may even reduce the level of simplicity and 
clarity in the current Standard. 
6. Id. § 3-5.5. Although this Standard refers to the "methods by which a prosecutor may pursue 
criminal charges, including complaints, informations, and grand jury indictments," the substance of the 
Standard focuses not on a prosecutor's "methods" of charging but, rather, on the prosecutor's belief in 
the factual basis for the charges, his belief in the defendant's guilt or innocence, and the avoidance of 
improper considerations in charging. Id.; see also discussion infra Part II.C-G. 
7. /d. § 3-5.6. The Task Force also revised and renumbered current Standards 3-3.4,3-3.5,3-3.6, 
and 3-3.8, which deal with the prosecutor's relations with investigators, complainants, and the grand 
jury, and a prosecutor's consideration of noncriminal dispositions. Compare id. §§ 3-5.1, 3-5.2, 3-5·3, 3-
5.4 (providing the Task Force proposed revisions), with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION §§ 3-3.4, 3-3.5, 3-3.6, 3-3.8 (3d ed. 1993) (providing the current, unrevised 
Standards). As noted below, current Standard 3-3.7, dealing with the "quality and scope of evidence 
for information," has been renumbered as proposed Standard 3-5.5(a). See discussion infra Part n.B. 
Given the limited space and time constraints, I have decided to focus exclusively on the revisions to 
the principal charging standard: current Standard 3-3.9. 
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proposed Standard 3-1.3, entitled "Improper Bias Prohibited."s This 
Standard provides in subdivision (a), "A prosecutor should not invidiously 
discriminate against, or in favor of, any person on the basis of 
constitutionally or statutorily impermissible criteria," and "should not 
use other improper considerations (such as partisan or other improper 
political or personal factors) in exercising prosecutorial discretion.,,9 
With the exception of establishing the appropriate evidentiary standard 
for charging, it would appear that as an ethical proscription, proposed 
Standard 3-1.3 would adequately cover a prosecutor's charging conduct. 
It might, therefore, seem unnecessary and superfluous to include in the 
"charging Standards" a list of factors and considerations that rely on a 
prosecutor's policy, expertise, and judgment. 
To be sure, the Task Force has made significant changes to the 
current Standards with respect to the proper factors and considerations 
that affect a prosecutor's charging conduct. My comments are intended 
to assess the extent to which the Task Force has addressed several 
charging issues effectively, inadequately, or at all. My comments focus 
specifically on (I) the retention and modification of the probable cause 
standard for filing charges; (2) the differing standards for filing and 
maintaining charges; (3) the role of innocence in the charging decision; 
(4) discretionary factors in the charging decision; (5) improper 
considerations in the charging decision; (6) the role of race and 
community pressure; (7) the issue of filing multiple charges-so-called 
"overcharging" -and (8) the Standard for actions premised on a 
defendant's agreement not to sue.IO 
1. ABA PROSECUTION FUNCTION STANDARDS 
Current Standard 3-3.9, entitled "Discretion in the Charging 
Decision," is modified by two of the new proposed Standards, Standards 
3-5.5 and 3-5.6 respectively. This Part describes the provisions set forth in 
each of these Standards. 
8. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: I'ROSECunON FUNcnON § 3-1.3 (Proposed Revisions 2009). 
9. [d. 
10. There is no Standard that addresses a prosecutor's decision to charge capital murder. The 
only reference to the death penalty in the proposed Standards appears in Standard 3-6.6, relating to 
the preservation of evidence in death penalty cases. [d. § 3-6.6. Unquestionably, a prosecutor plays a 
central role in deciding whether to invoke capital punishment, and a large majority of states and the 
federal government authorize capital punishment. Charging capital murder presents many discretionary 
considerations for a prosecutor, involving specific aggravating and mitigating factors not usually 
considered in charging non capital crimes. Even though the ABA apparently takes no position on the 
death penalty, it is surprising that the Prosecution Function Standards do not address the range of 
issues relating to a prosecutor's charging conduct in death penalty cases. 
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A. CURRENT STANDARD 3-3.9: DISCRETION IN THE CHARGING DECISION 
Current Standard 3-3.9 conditions and circumscribes the 
prosecutor's decision to institute charges against individuals. In particular, 
a prosecutor is advised not to bring or maintain criminal charges when 
she "knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause."11 
Likewise, where she "has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the 
accused," her supervisor ought not to compel her to bring or maintain 
charges. I2 The prosecutor also ought to have "sufficient admissible 
evidence to support a conviction" when bringing or maintaining those 
charges. I3 In fact, she "should not bring or seek charges greater ... than 
can reasonably be supported with evidence at trial or than are necessary 
to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense. ,,14 
On the other hand, when deciding to bring charges, a prosecutor 
may decide not to prosecute certain charges, even in the presence of 
"sufficient evidence ... [to] support a conviction," where "circumstances 
and ... good cause consistent with the public interest" warrant such a 
decision. IS The Standard lists a number of "illustrative" factors that the 
prosecutor may consider deciding whether to bring or maintain charges, 
including (I) reasonable doubt as to the accused's actual guilt; (2) "the 
extent of the harm caused by the offense;" (3) the proportionality of the 
potential punishment "to the particular offense or the offender;" (4) the 
motives of the accuser; (5) the victim's willingness to testify; (6) the 
degree to which the accused assists in prosecuting others; and (7) the 
"availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction. ,,16 In 
addition to these factors, a prosecutor should not consider the personal 
or political costs and benefits that might derive from the decision to bring 
or maintain criminal charges. I7 Moreover, where there is "a serious threat 
to the community," she must not decline to press charges on the ground 
that juries in the community tend "to acquit persons accused of the 
particular kind of criminal act in question,,18 
Finally, the Standard addresses the decision to dismiss any charges, 
entry of nolle prosequi, or "similar action": ending the case should not be 
"condition[ed] ... on the accused's relinquishment of the right to seek 
civil redress unless the accused has agreed to the action knowingly and 
II. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed.I993). 
12. [d. § 3-3.9(C). 
13· [d. § 3-).9(a). 
14· [d. § 3-).9(f). 
IS· [d. § 3-).9(b). 
16. [d. § 3-3.9(b)(i)--(vii). 
17· [d. § 3-).9( d). 
18. [d. § 3-).9(e). 
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intelligently, freely and voluntarily, and where such waiver is approved 
by the court.,,19 
B. PROPOSED STANDARD 3-5.5: THE DECISION TO FILE AND MAINTAIN 
CRIMINAL CHARGES 
By contrast, the proposed Standards divide the aspects of a 
prosecutor's job into two different sections. The first, in proposed 
Standard 3-5.5, is "The Decision to File and Maintain Criminal 
Charges. ,,20 That Standard conditions the initial filing of charges on 
whether "the prosecutor believes the charges are supported by probable 
cause and reasonably believes that there will be admissible evidence to 
support the charges beyond reasonable doubt by the time of 
disposition.,,21 As in the current Standard, the prosecutor should not 
consider the potential personal or political costs and benefits in deciding 
whether to file and maintain charges. Additionally, with particular 
respect to the decision to charge "[r]ace or other unlawful factors should 
never be considered .... ,,22 However, irrespective of the weight of the 
evidence in the case, "if the prosecutor believes the defendant is 
innocent," she should neither file nor maintain charges.23 
Once the prosecutor files charges, those charges "should [be] 
maintain[ ed] only if the prosecutor reasonably believes that probable 
cause continues to exist" and that there will be enough "admissible 
evidence to support the charges beyond reasonable doubt by the time of 
disposition.,,24 Dismissal of charges is therefore warranted when a 
"prosecutor reasonably believes there is no probable cause to support 
them."25 Finally, "[a] prosecutor should not take criminal charges to final 
judgment if the prosecutor reasonably believes that proof of guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt is lacking. ,,26 
C. PROPOSED STANDARD 3-5.6: DISCRETION IN FILING AND MAINTAINING 
CRIMINAL CHARGES 
The second aspect, in Standard 3-5.6, focuses on the exercise of 
discretion in prosecuting a case. Entitled "Discretion in Filing and 
Maintaining Criminal Charges," the Standard clarifies that a prosecutor 
may exercise their discretion in deciding whether and what charges to 
bring and maintain in light of the available evidence. In particular, the 
19· [d. § 3-3.9(g). 
20. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-S.S (Proposed Revisions 2009). 
21. [d. § 3-s.s(a). 
22. [d. § 3-S.S( d). 
23· [d. § 3-S.S(C). 
24. [d. § 3-S·S(b). 
2S· [d. § 3-S.S(C). 
26. [d. 
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prosecutor need not "file or maintain all criminal charges which the 
evidence might support. ,,27 Indeed, she may decline to prosecute a case, 
despite the state of the evidence, where circumstances and "good cause 
consistent with the public interest" may warrant's Factors that a 
prosecutor "may properly consider" when deciding to "decline or dismiss 
charges" include the following: (1) any reasonable doubt as to the 
accused's actual guilt; (2) "the extent of the harm caused by the offense;" 
(3) the proportionality of the potential punishment "to the particular 
offense or the offender;" (4) the motives of the accuser; (5) the victim's 
willingness to testify; (6) any "improper conduct by law enforcement 
actors in the matter;" (7) the degree to which prosecuting the case would 
undermine "the policy that similarly situated persons be treated equally;" 
(8) the "potential collateral impact[] on third-parties, including witnesses 
or victims;" (9) the degree to which the accused assists in prosecuting 
others; (10) the particulars of the offender's character, or his situation; 
(11) "changes in the evidence, legal rules, disposition of similar cases, or 
in the larger cultural context, including that the statute has fallen into 
desuetude;" (12) the effect on the public welfare of the decision either to 
prosecute or to decline to prosecute; (13) "the fair and efficient 
distribution of limited prosecutorial resources;" and (14) "the availability 
and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction. ,,29 Another 
important consideration is the Standard's directive that "[t]he prosecutor 
should not file or maintain charges greater in number or degree than can 
reasonably be supported with evidence at trial and that are necessary to 
fairly reflect the gravity of the offense or deter similar conduct."30 
However, if the evidence does support the charges, "[a] prosecutor may 
file and maintain charges even if juries in the jurisdiction" typically 
"acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in 
question. ,,3 1 
The Standard further advises prosecutors to express any doubts 
about the evidence in their cases to their supervisors. If an "individual 
prosecutor has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused," her 
supervisor should not compel her to prosecute the case.32 But, the office 
may still bring or maintain criminal charges "where there is reasonable 
disagreement" about the evidence in the case and where the office 
complies "with other applicable standards.,,33 
27· Id. § 3-s.6(a). 
28. Id. 
29. /d. § 3-s.6(a)(i)-(xiv). 
30. Id. § 3-S.6( d). 
3I. Id. § 3-S.6(c). 
32. Id. § 3-S.6(b). 
33. Id. 
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Finally, with respect to dismissal, nolle prosequi, and other actions 
ending a criminal case, "[a] prosecutor may condition" such an action 
"on the accused's relinquishment of a right to seek civil redress, only if 
the accused has agreed to the action knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily, and such waiver is disclosed to the court.,,34 But, the 
"decision not to file criminal charges should be made on its merits and 
not for the purpose of obtaining a civil waiver. ,,35 Such a waiver should 
not be used "to avoid a bona fide claim of improper law enforcement.,,36 
II. SOME COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED STANDARDS 
The provisions in the proposed Standards are markedly different 
from the ones set forth in the current Standard. The remainder of this 
Article parses through these differences, which, if adopted, could 
significantly impact the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
A. RETENTION AND MODIFICATION OF THE PROBABLE CAUSE STANDARD 
Proposed Standard 3-5.5 retains the "probable cause" standard for 
instituting criminal charges3? but describes the prosecutor's mental state 
differently than does the current Standard 3-3.9(a).38 Under the proposed 
Standard, "A prosecutor should file criminal charges only if the 
prosecutor believes the charges are supported by probable cause.,,39 
Under the current Standard, "A prosecutor should not 
institute ... criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges 
are not supported by probable cause.,,40 Two points are noteworthy. 
First, the proposed Standard uses different language to describe the 
prosecutor's mental state-namely, "believes" instead of "knows.,,41 
Interestingly, both the current Standard and the proposed Standard focus 
exclusively on the prosecutor's subjective state of mind; neither Standard 
requires that the prosecutor's belief be objectively reasonable.42 To be 
34. [d. § 3-5.6( e). 
35. [d. 
36. [d. 
37· [d. § 3-5·5· 
38. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993). As noted, 
the prefatory language in proposed Standard 3-5.5 states that the Standard addresses "the methods by 
which a prosecutor may pursue criminal charges, including complaints, informations, and grand jury 
indictments." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions 
2009). However, as also noted, the text of the current Standard appears to say nothing about these 
"methods" of charging, focusing instead on the prosecutor's mental state in filing and maintaining 
charges. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993). 
39. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions 2009) 
(emphasis added). 
40. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis 
added). 
41. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions 2009). 
42. It is noteworthy that the Standards do not define the terms used to describe the prosecutor's 
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sure, as an evidentiary standard, it does seem much more appropriate to 
refer to what a prosecutor "believes" rather than what a prosecutor 
"knows." Indeed, we typically refer to a police officer's belief in probable 
cause, rather than to his "knowing" of the existence of probable cause. 
And under the familiar definition of probable cause- "reasonable 
ground for belief of guilt ,,43 - one would therefore understand this 
Standard to require a prosecutor "to believe that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe," which is a peculiar mindset but is, nonetheless, the 
basis required by this Standard. 
Second, both the current Standard and the proposed Standard 
require a prosecutor to have a subjective belief that there exists at least 
some quantum of proof in terms of the scope and quality of evidence 
amounting to "probable cause" before filing charges-in other words, 
that it is more likely than not that a crime was committed and that the 
defendant committed it. As the commentary to the current Standard 
acknowledges, a probable cause standard is an extremely low threshold 
for bringing charges.44 Indeed, unless there is some basis for believing 
that a prosecutor filed charges in bad faith for the purpose of 
harassment, retaliation, or discrimination, it would seem to be virtually 
impossible to demonstrate that, when she brought charges, a prosecutor 
lacked a subjective belief that they were supported by probable cause. As 
either an ethical or a practice-oriented rule, this Standard seems to 
require so little of a prosecutor that short of venality, it would appear to 
allow reckless and incompetent charging without any risk of professional 
oversight.45 
This is not to say that applying a probable cause standard in practice 
does not raise useful questions which both the current and the proposed 
Standards fail to address specifically. For example, there is no indication 
that either the current or proposed Standards require a prosecutor to 
conduct any investigation or to consider the quality and quantity of 
evidence before determining that probable cause exists. As a matter of 
professional ethics, should not a prosecutor investigate the credibility of 
the complainant and witnesses before bringing charges? Should not a 
mental state, including terms such as "knows," "believes," and "reasonably believes." Presumably, the 
Standards rely on Rule 1.0 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, entitled "Terminology," for 
definitions of these terms. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf R. 1.0 (2010). 
43. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,175-76 (1949). 
44. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCfION § 3-3·9 cmt. (3d ed. 1993) 
("[P)robable cause standard, which is substantially less than sufficient admissible evidence to sustain a 
conviction, is sufficiently minimal that a prosecutor should not err in deciding whether the quantum of 
evidence is adequate to institute criminal proceedings."). 
45. Notably, the Model Rules also use the probable cause standard for criminal charges. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf R. 3.8 (2010) ("Special Responsibility of a Prosecutor"). However, 
the Model Rules treat a prosecutor's conduct in a much more limited fashion than do the far more 
specific and comprehensive ABA Criminal Justice Standards. 
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prosecutor consider contradictory evidence that negates guilt? Consider 
the following case: 
A complainant alleges she was sexually attacked by three students 
after she was hired to engage in an exotic dance performance at a 
college party. She identifies from a police photo lineup the three 
individuals who allegedly attacked her. Medical procedures detect 
vaginal swelling, and a professional opines that her behavior is 
consistent with that of a victim of a sex crime.46 
Under the current Standard, a prosecutor could believe that there is 
probable cause that a rape occurred and that the three persons identified 
by the complainant committed this crime. However, should a prosecutor, 
as a matter of professional ethics and sound prosecutorial practice, be 
required to conduct an investigation to determine the accuracy of the 
allegation? Moreover, should a prosecutor be required to consider 
contradictory evidence in evaluating whether probable cause exists? For 
example, assume that the prosecutor in the above case receives reliable 
evidence that the complainant was intoxicated during the party, that she 
initially misidentified one of the perpetrators as not being involved, that 
she initially recanted her claim that she had been raped, that she had a 
history of mental illness, that no DNA from the rape kit matched any of 
the three alleged perpetrators but did match several other males, and 
that a friend of the complainant who was with her at the party described 
her rape allegation as a fabrication. 
As an ethical matter, as well as a matter of policy and judgment, the 
proposed Standard authorizes a prosecutor to file criminal charges "only 
if the prosecutor believes the charges are supported by probable cause. "47 
Are they? The complainant has identified three perpetrators as having 
raped her, and there is some corroboration. Should a prosecutor, in 
forming a belief in the existence of probable cause, consider the 
substantial evidence that appears to contradict guilt? The proposed 
Standard does not answer this question. It would seem that if the 
Standard requires that the prosecutor's belief be reasonable, then a 
prosecutor would likely have to consider this contradictory evidence. 
Obviously many prosecutors, as a matter of policy and judgment, 
probably would consider evidence negating probable cause before 
bringing charges. However, a Standard that presumes to serve as a 
guideline for professionally proper prosecutorial conduct should 
46. I have used as the basis for this hypothetical the highly publicized and controversial Duke 
lacrosse rape case. For a comprehensive account of the case, see STUART TAYLOR, JR. & KC JOHNSON, 
UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLmCAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE 
LACROSSE RAPE CASE (2007). For a discussion of the prosecutor and the media in the case, see Andrew 
E. Taslitz, The Incautious Media, Free Speech, and the Unfair Trial: Why Prosecutors Need More 
Realistic Guidance in Dealing with the Press, 62 HASTINGS LJ. 1285, 1294-98 (201 I). 
47. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNcnON § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions 2009). 
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explicitly require a prosecutor to consider the credibility of witnesses and 
the existence of contradictory evidence before instituting charges. 
Aside from considering the scope and quality of the proof in 
"believing" that probable cause exists, does a prosecutor's determination 
of probable cause include an interpretation of a broadly worded criminal 
statute that mayor may not cover certain conduct? In other words, does 
probable cause include a legal determination, or merely a factual one? 
Consider the following case: 
Assume that a federal prosecutor is deciding whether to bring charges 
against Defendant for "introducing into interstate commerce a 
misbranded food with intent to defraud or mislead. ,,48 The facts show 
that Defendant bought two million bottles of salad dressing from a 
manufacturer and planned to resell the bottles to consumers through 
discount outlets such as "dollar stores." The label on each bottle 
originally contained a notation "best when purchased by," followed by 
a date. Before reselling the bottles, the defendant pasted a new label 
on the bottle over the part containing the "best when purchased by" 
date by adding a new date marked six months later. The prosecutor, in 
deciding to charge Defendant with fraud, has characterized the change 
as the date when "the dressing would expire." Although the statute 
defines misbranded food, there is nothing about dates on labels. No 
regulation of the Food and Drug Administration defines "best when 
purchased by" or forbids a wholesaler or retailer to change the date. 49 
Is there a basis for the prosecutor to believe that there is probable 
cause that the defendant violated the above statute? Assume there is no 
evidence, as the prosecutor should realize, that selling the salad dressing 
after the "best when purchased by" date endangers health or affects the 
taste, or that any consumer has complained. Moreover, the prosecutor, in 
filing the charge, needs to assume that changing the dates on labels 
constitutes "misbranding" and is conduct intended to "defraud and 
mislead." To be sure, among the discretionary factors that would affect 
the prosecutor's decision to charge are the harm caused by the offense, 
the impact of prosecution on the public welfare, and whether the 
prosecutor has a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. Given the 
fact that charging abuses can occur from a prosecutor's overly broad 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute,SO it might be appropriate for the 
proposed Standards to clarify that the probable cause standard applies 
not only to a prosecutor's belief in the evidentiary basis for the charge, 
48. United States v. Farinella, 558 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 21 U.S.c. §§ 331(a), 
333(a)(2) (2006». 
49. This example is adapted from United States v. Farinella, 558 F·3d 695. 
So. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2907 (2010) (holding that 18 U.S.c. § 1346, the 
so-called "honest services" statute, covers only bribery and kickback schemes and does not authorize 
prosecutors to charge public or private officials with undisclosed self-dealing). 
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but also to a prosecutor's belief that the statute reasonably covers the 
charged offense.sl 
B. DIFFERING STANDARDS FOR INITIAL CHARGE, RETENTION OF CHARGE, 
AND DISPOSITION 
Under current Standard 3-3.9(a), a prosecutor is forbidden, after 
instituting criminal charges, to "permit the continued pendency" of those 
charges "when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported 
by probable cause," and "in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence 
to support a conviction."s2 Under proposed Standard 3-s.s(a), as noted 
above, a prosecutor is authorized to file criminal charges "only if the 
prosecutor believes the charges are supported by probable cause and 
reasonably believes that there will be admissible evidence to support the 
charges beyond a reasonable doubt by the time of disposition."s3 
Moreover, under proposed Standard 3-S.S(b), the prosecutor is 
authorized to "maintain criminal charges only if the prosecutor 
reasonably believes that probable cause continues to exist and that the 
prosecution has or will obtain admissible evidence to support the charges 
beyond a reasonable doubt by the time of disposition.,,54 As in the 
current Standard, the proposed Standard continues to draw a distinction 
with respect to the prosecutor's state of mind between filing criminal 
charges and maintaining those charges, namely, that a prosecutor may 
file charges only if he actually believes that probable cause exists, but 
may maintain the charges only if there is an objective, reasonable basis 
for him to believe that probable cause continues to exist. 
Imposing one standard for a prosecutor's mental state in the initial 
filing of charges and another for the continued retention of charges raises 
several questions. First, it would appear to be illogical to authorize a 
prosecutor to file a charge if the prosecutor subjectively believes there is 
probable cause, but to forbid a prosecutor to maintain the charge when 
he lacks a reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. 
Moreover, as a matter of professional ethics, there should be no 
distinction in terms of the prosecutor's belief in the existence of probable 
cause when deciding to file the charge and when deciding to maintain the 
charge. There does not appear to be any good reason why the standard 
for charging should be more forgiving and less rigorous than the standard 
for maintaining the charge. In fact, there may be cogent reasons for 
5 I. The same might be said of a potential charge that may be time-barred or a charge based on 
evidence that may be subject to exclusion for unlawful police conduct. 
52. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNcnON § 3-3.9(a) (3d ed. 1993) (emphasis 
added). 
53. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECunON FUNcnON § 3-5.5(a) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
54· Id. § 3-5·5(b). 
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imposing an even more rigorous standard for the initial charging decision 
than for the decision to continue the charge. 
Unquestionably, the mere filing of a charge can have devastating 
consequences on a person's life, liberty, and reputation. As noted above, 
the subjective probable cause standard is so minimal that it offers very 
little protection from careless and reckless charging, to say nothing of a 
prosecutor's deliberate and bad faith charging. Indeed, in the rape case 
above, the damage to the defendants' lives from the prosecutor's charge 
was enormous.55 Moreover, there are sound reasons for a prosecutor to 
be more careful in making the initial charging decision than in the 
charge~retention decision. As in the rape hypothetical, there were many 
cues that should have alerted the prosecutor to the deficiencies of the 
complainant's story and the reliability of her identifications. Before any 
charges are formally instituted, a prosecutor has much greater latitude to 
investigate the case and to scrutinize the credibility of evidence, as well 
as the motives of victims and witnesses. Once formal charges are 
brought, however, and the die is cast, so to speak, it may be much more 
difficult for a prosecutor to scrutinize the evidence as she would have 
done earlier. Indeed, once charges are brought, a prosecutor's mindset 
may take on a tunnel~vision quality, focusing only on the evidence of 
guilt and disregarding evidence that is inconsistent with guilt. Equally 
important, once the victim knows that a charge has been filed based on 
her complaint, it may be much more difficult for the victim to recant or 
acknowledge a mistake. This may especially be the case when the victim 
has made an earlier identification.56 The ability of a prosecutor to 
scrutinize the accuracy of that identification would seem to be greater 
before a charge is filed than after. Further, once charges are filed, and 
the case is in the public arena, there are many systemic protections 
available for an accused to correct a mistaken charge, which are 
unavailable prior to charges being filed.57 Finally, the prosecutor is always 
protected from a false or mistaken charge by the availability of plea 
deals, even in cases where the prosecutor does not reasonably believe 
that probable cause exists.58 
55. Taslitz, supra note 46, at 1294-96. 
56. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) ("Moreover, lilt is a matter of common 
experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on 
his word later on .... " (alteration in original) (quoting Glanville Williams & HA. Hammelmann, 
Identification Parades-I, 1963 CRIM. L. REv. 479, 482) (internal quotation marks omitted». 
57. Such procedural protections include a motion to dismiss the indictment or information, a 
motion to suppress evidence relating to the charge, and, of course, the right to a trial, either before a 
judge or a jury. 
58. See People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41, 44-45 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that a prosecutor's failure to 
disclose during plea negotiations that complaining witness had died does not invalidate plea); see also 
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002) (holding that a prosecutor was not required to disclose 
during plea negotiations evidence that could undermine the credibility of government witnesses). 
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C. CHARGING AND INNOCENCE 
Given the increasing concern by courts, commentators, and the 
public over the prosecution and conviction of innocent persons, the 
proposed Standards have addressed explicitly in Standard 3-S.S(c) the 
prosecutor's filing and maintaining criminal charges against potentially 
innocent persons.59 Once again, as in proposed Standards 3-s.s(a) and 
(b), Standard 3-S.S(c) makes a distinction between a prosecutor's 
subjective and objective mental states.60 Thus, according to this Standard, 
"A prosecutor should not file or maintain charges if the prosecutor 
believes the defendant is innocent, no matter what the state of the 
evidence. ,,61 The proposition that a prosecutor should not charge 
someone with a crime whom he believes is innocent may seem so obvious 
as not to require a special ethical rule.62 Nevertheless, such a Standard 
might be relevant, as in the rape case above, where a prosecutor has 
legally sufficient evidence to charge and convict, and where it is 
conceivable that a jury might convict based on that proof, but the 
prosecutor does not believe the truth of that evidence. This Standard 
would authorize the prosecutor to dismiss the charge, even though 
sufficient evidence of guilt exists to persuade a jury to convict.63 
The proposed Standard also appears to address more directly an 
ethical question that has attracted some attention, which was considered 
in the current Standard but not resolved.64 Consider a case in which a 
prosecutor has filed charges based on probable cause. While the case is 
pending, the evidence of guilt disappears-as for example, when the 
government's key witness dies-but the defense is unaware of this 
occurrence. Under these circumstances, according to proposed Standard 
3-S.S(c), "the prosecutor reasonably believes that proof of guilt beyond 
reasonable doubt is lacking" and under this Standard, "should not take 
criminal charges to final judgment.,,65 Obviously, a prosecutor would not 
59. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(c) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
60. [d. 
61. [d. 
62. Proposed Standard 3-5.6(a)(i), as in current Standard 3-3.9(b)(i), states that one of the 
discretionary factors that a prosecutor may consider in charging is "the prosecutor's reasonable doubt 
that the accused is in fact guilty." [d. § 3-5.6(a)(i); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b )(i) (3d ed. 1993). A reasonable doubt, needless to say, is different 
from actually believing a defendant is innocent. 
63. Whether it is ethical for a prosecutor to ask a jury to convict when the prosecutor himself 
harbors a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt is a question that the Standards do not address. 
64. See People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41, 42 (N.Y. 1978) (holding that the prosecutor was not 
required to disclose to defense during plea negotiations that a key witness had died). The commentary 
to current Standard 3-3.9 states, "This Standard takes no position on this question." STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9 emt. (3d ed. 1993). 
65. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(c) (Proposed Revisions 
2009). The term "final judgment" typically includes not only a conviction after trial but a conviction by 
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bring such a case to trial; he lacks sufficient evidence to convict. But 
assuming the defense requested that the prosecutor accept a plea, would 
the prosecutor ethically be allowed to enter into such a deal when the 
deal would lead to a "final judgment" through a guilty plea-even 
though the prosecutor "reasonably believes that proof of gUilt beyond 
reasonable doubt is lacking"? The proposed Standard appears to 
preclude a prosecutor from accepting a plea offer leading to a final 
judgment. But, if a defendant initiates a plea deal and voluntarily admits 
his guilt, why should the prosecutor be precluded from accepting the 
plea? 
Moreover, as noted above, the proposed Standards are silent as to 
whether a prosecutor should be required, as a matter of professional 
ethics, to investigate the case before charging and to consider 
contradictory and exculpatory evidence in deciding whether to charge. It 
would seem that the special interest in the proposed Standards in a 
defendant's innocence would be well-served by explicitly noting, either in 
the Standard relating to probable cause for charging or even as 
"illustrative factors" relevant to a prosecutor's discretionary decision to 
decline or dismiss charges,66 the requirement that a prosecutor investigate 
the case before charging, as well as a requirement that a prosecutor 
consider contradictory and exculpatory evidence. 
Also relevant to the question of innocence is a new provision in the 
proposed Standard 3-5.6(b) requiring an individual prosecutor to disclose 
to his supervisor any significant doubts about the quality or sufficiency of 
the evidence in a case "assigned to the prosecutor.,,67 The current 
Standard, 3-3.9(c), merely states that a "prosecutor should not be 
compelled by his or her supervisor to prosecute a case in which he or she 
has a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused.,,68 The proposed 
Standard restates this principle, but goes on to state that the office may 
continue prosecution anyway.69 In doing so, the proposed Standard 
leaves several questions unresolved. Even though an assistant prosecutor 
may not be compelled to prosecute a case in which he has significant 
doubts about the defendant's guilt, is it permissible for his supervisor to 
take punitive action against that prosecutor? The Standard does not 
answer this question. Moreover, what if an individual prosecutor has 
significant doubts about a case not "assigned to the prosecutor"? There 
a guilty plea as well. Boykin v. Alabama, 39S U.S. 238, 242 (1969) ("A plea of gUilty is more than a 
confession which admits that the accused did the various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains 
but to give judgment and determine punishment."). 
66. See discussion infra Part 11.0. 
67. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-S.6(b) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
68. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3·3.9(c) (3d ed. 1993). 
69. STANDARDS FOR CRiMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-S.6(b) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
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is no requirement in the Standard that he disclose these doubts to his 
supervisor, even though nondisclosure may result in a wrongful 
prosecution against a potentially innocent defendant. It would seem that 
if a prosecutor reasonably believes that a wrongful prosecution is being 
pursued by any prosecutor in his office, he has a duty to alert his 
supervisor. 
D. DISCRETIONARY FACTORS IN CHARGING 
The current Standard 3-3.9 enumerates as "illustrative" several 
factors that may properly be considered by a prosecutor in exercising the 
charging function.70 Proposed Standard 3-5.6 adds several other factors to 
the list.71 First, the prefatory language in the current Standard states that 
these factors may properly be considered by a prosecutor in exercising 
his discretion to bring charges.72 The proposed Standard states that these 
factors may properly be considered by a prosecutor in exercising his 
discretion "to decline or dismiss charges.,,73 It is unclear why the proposed 
Standard enumerates these factors as reasons to "decline or dismiss" 
charges rather than as factors used to decide whether to file charges in 
the first place. Moreover, the inclusion in the list of several new factors, 
as noted below, appears to reflect factors that prosecutors routinely 
consider in deciding whether to charge. However, neither the current nor 
the proposed Standards attempt to establish any priority or hierarchy 
with respect to these factors, presumably suggesting that these factors are 
of equal importance. 
The factors identified in the current Standard - all of which are 
retained in the proposed Standard-are discussed at length in the 
commentary to the current Standard.74 These factors are familiar and 
unexceptional. Thus, a prosecutor should consider whether he believes 
the accused is guilty, the extent of the harm caused by the offense, 
whether the punishment is excessive, any improper motives of the 
complainant, any reluctance of victim to testify, any cooperation of the 
accused in the apprehension of others, and the likelihood of prosecution 
in another jurisdiction.75 
The proposed Standard adds six new factors76 to the list, which may 
best be examined by considering the following case: 
70. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNGnON § 3-3.9(b)(i)--(vii) (3d ed. (993). 
71. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNGnON § 3-5.6(a)(i)-(xiv) (Proposed 
Revisions 2009). 
72. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(b) (3d ed. 1993). 
73. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNGnON § 3-5.6(a) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
74. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNGnON § 3-3.9 em!. (3d ed. (993). 
75· [d. § 3-3·9· 
76. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNGnON § 3-5.6(a) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
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Joe and Tom are having sex on a picnic table in a public park around 5 
p.m. Joe, thirty-five years old, is married with two young children and 
works for a computer company. Tom, nineteen years old, is a college 
student. The couple is spotted by two thirteen-year-old boys who tell 
their mothers. They called the police who arrive at the scene and arrest 
Joe and Tom. The prosecutor decides to charge Joe with adultery and 
Tom with public lewdness. The prosecutor, an elected official, has a 
reputation as a strong social conservative who has made public 
comments decrying homosexuality, abortion, and teenage sex. The 
prosecutor believes there is probable cause for the charges, has no 
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, reasonably believes that 
given the testimony of witnesses he will have sufficient admissible 
evidence to convict, and believes that the public conduct in question is 
extremely harmful to the morals and quality of life in his community.77 
1275 
Several of the newly-added factors listed in the proposed Standards raise 
questions about whether it is proper to charge adultery in the above case. 
Consider the application of the following discretionary factors in the 
proposed Standards: 
I. The prosecutor is aware of the existence of extramarital affairs in 
his community between married men and women. No charge of 
adultery has ever been brought in such cases, even though guilt 
could be proved. Does the prosecution of Joe for adultery 
"undercut the policy that similarly situated persons be treated 
equally"?78 
2. Given that Joe has a wife and children and that the two young 
boys who witnessed the sexual conduct will be made to testify if 
the case goes to trial, will the prosecution of Joe have adverse 
"potential collateral impacts on third-parties"T9 
3. Given that Joe has an apparently intact family, with two young 
children, a steady job, and no criminal record, are Joe's 
"character" and "situation" relevant mitigating considerations?80 
4. Assuming that there have been only a few prosecutions for 
adultery in this jurisdiction in the past fifty years, have there also 
been sufficient "changes in the larger cultural context" in this 
community and has the statute "fallen into desuetude," making a 
charge of adultery inappropriatet' 
5. What impact will such prosecution have on the "public 
welfare,,?8 
6. Does this prosecution reflect a "fair and efficient distribution of 
limited prosecutorial resources,,?83 
77. This example is adapted from Eamon McNiff, Woman Charged with Adultery to Challenge 
New York Law, ABC NEWS (June 8, 2010), http://abcnews.go.comlprint?id=108S7437. 
78. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-s.6(a)(vii) (Proposed Revisions 
2(09). 
79. [d. § 3-s·6(a)(viii). 
80. [d. § 3-s.6(a)(x). 
81. [d. § 3-s.6(a)(xi). 
82. [d. § 3-s.6(a)(xii). 
83. [d. § 3-s.6(a)(xiii). 
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This case reflects the difficulty of imposing meaningful professional 
standards on a prosecutor's charging discretion. To be sure, factors such 
as these are clearly relevant to a prosecutor's careful and responsible 
charging decision; that's what discretion is all about. But these factors are 
so malleable and subjective that they arguably would lead some 
prosecutors not to bring charges of adultery, while at the same time 
justifying the decision to bring the very same charge. What complicates 
the issue is the fact that this prosecutor holds strong views against 
homosexuals and promiscuous sex, which the citizens who elected him 
may well endorse, and his charging decision therefore may be 
undertaken to further on his own personal and political ambitions. In 
short, the enumeration of additional discretionary factors makes the list 
more complete, but not necessarily more meaningful. 
E. PERSONAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND UNLAWFUL FACTORS 
IN CHARGING 
Current Standard 3-3.9(d) and the proposed Standard 3-5.S(d) state 
essentially the same principle in slightly different language: a prosecutor, 
in bringing or maintaining criminal charges, should not consider personal 
or political advantages or disadvantages, or the possibility of enhancing 
his record of convictions.84 The proposed Standard adds new language 
that does not appear in the current Standard: "Race or other unlawful 
factors should never be considered in a decision to charge.,,85 Consider 
the following case: 
Defendant, a state procurement official, is charged with fraudulent 
misapplication of funds by allegedly steering a large contract to a travel 
agency whose principal had donated heavily to the governor's 
reelection campaign. The prosecutor, currently involved in a tough 
reelection campaign himself, promotes, through a barrage of attack 
ads, the claim that the charge against the procurement official is 
evidence of corruption in the state government, which is controlled by 
the opposite political party. During his tenure, the prosecutor has 
brought several other corruption cases against government officials of 
the opposite political party. He has never brought charges against 
officials of his own party. There is evidence that the travel agency 
submitted the lowest bid, and there is no evidence of a kickback or any 
other impropriety in the acceptance of the bid. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that the defendant knew or cared about the travel agency's 
contribution to the governor. As one witness recalls, the defendant had 
stated that the winning bidder should be selected for "political 
reasons," but this witness had understood the defendant's remark to be 
referring to the state's interest in fiscal responsibility and the fact that 
84. Compare STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(d) (3d ed. 1993). 
with STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-S.S(d) (Proposed Revisions 2009). 
85. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3·S.S(d) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
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the travel agency was from the same state. The prosecutor is 
reelected.86 
1277 
In examining the charging standards, does this case implicate any of 
the expressed concerns over charging for personal or political reasons? 
Did the prosecutor actually believe there was probable cause for the 
charge? Given the defendant's statement about "politics" and the 
intimation of a close connection between the travel agency and the 
governor, it would be virtually impossible to show that the prosecutor did 
not believe that there was probable cause to charge. However, did the 
prosecutor "consider [his] personal or political advantages" in bringing 
the charge?87 Although according to this Standard, "unlawful factors 
should never be considered in a decision to charge,,,gg did the prosecutor 
consider such factors in deciding to charge, namely, did he target this 
defendant for prosecution because of her membership in a particular 
political party? It might be useful to cross-reference this Standard with 
proposed Standard 3- I .3, noted above, which prohibits prosecutors from 
engaging in purposeful discrimination or basing conduct on legally-
protected activities.&! 
Perhaps the most that professional standards can do is to articulate 
aspirational goals that probably can never be attained completely.1JO 
There is no question that politics and personal advantage often enter into 
prosecutorial decisionmaking, and it is better at least to set a high 
standard. This is likely a place where a prosecutor's own personal 
integrity and good judgment will determine his official conduct, and 
general standards can provide very little guidance or deterrence. 
F. RACE AND COMMUNITY PRESSURE 
Current Standard 3-3.9 does not mention the impact of race or 
community pressure on a prosecutor's charging decision. Current 
Standard 3-3.9(e) and the proposed Standard 3-S.6(c) refer to the 
influence of community pressure on a prosecutor by stating that a 
prosecutor should not be deterred from instituting charges because juries 
in the jurisdiction have tended to acquit defendants for the particular 
86. This hypothetical was taken from United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877. 883-84 (7th Cir. 
2007) (dismissing a charge after finding that there was no evidence of fraud). 
87. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(d) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
88. ld. 
89. ld. § 3-1.3; see also supra pp. 1261--{i2. For cases holding that membership in a political party is 
a constitutionally protected activity, see Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 64-65 
(1990), Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517, 520 (1980), and Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350, 357 
(1976). 
90. Ellen S. Podgor, The Role of the Prosecution and Defense Function Standards: Stagnant or 
Progressive?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1159,1175 (2011). 
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crime involved.91 This latter principle would have relevance in a 
community that typically acquits law enforcement officials accused of 
using excessive force or that acquits defendants in domestic abuse 
prosecutions. The proposed Standard does not refer directly to the 
influence of community pressure on the charging decision but does state 
that "[r]ace or other unlawful factors should never be considered in the 
decision to charge."92 Consider the following case: 
Owner of a Korean grocery store in largely black neighborhood has 
been burglarized three times within the past six months. Other Korean 
merchants have been victimized as well, and they believe, with some 
justification, that their complaints to the police have not been 
aggressively investigated. Owner decides during a particular week to 
hide in the back of his store after closing time. One of these nights, 
when an intruder forces open the rear door, Owner, without warning, 
shoots and kills the intruder, who is a sixteen-year-old black youth with 
a record of burglaries and assaults. The jurisdiction's penal code 
provides that the use of deadly force is not justified unless the actor 
reasonably believes that the other person is attempting to dispossess 
him of his dwelling or is attempting to commit arson, burglary, 
robbery, or felonious theft of property, and the use of nondeadly force 
would expose the actor to the risk of serious bodily harm. Assume 
there is no evidence that the store is Owner's dwelling or that the use 
of nondeadly force would expose him to a risk of serious bodily harm. 
The prosecutor has the option of charging murder, some degree of 
manslaughter, or not charging any crime based on the view that Owner 
was justified in killing the intruder. 
This case suggests that prosecutors may be influenced, and 
legitimately, by considerations of race and community pressure in filing 
charges. The provision in the proposed Standard 3-5.5(d) that 
"[r]ace ... should never be considered in a decision to charge" is too 
broad. According to the hypothetical problem, the racial tensions in the 
community, and the perceived failure of law enforcement to adequately 
protect Korean business owners, motivated Owner to choose self-help 
and culminated in this killing. The prosecutor almost certainly will 
consider the racial tensions in the community and how race factors into 
the killing when making the charging decision, although perhaps only as 
a mitigating factor rather than as an exonerating factor. It would be 
difficult in hindsight to criticize as illegitimate the prosecutor's 
consideration of how race affects the prosecution of this case. The 
prosecutor knows he could secure an indictment for murder, and that the 
91. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3·S.6(C) (Proposed Revisions 
2009); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3'3.9 (3d ed. 1993). The Standard 
does not address the reverse situation - in other words, a case in which a prosecutor decides not to file 
charges because of his belief that juries would acquit. That seems to raise a more difficult ethical issue 
and probably should be addressed in the Standards. 
92. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3·S.S(d) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
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justification defense likely would not be successful. The prosecutor also 
reasonably expects that a mostly black jury with few or no Korean 
members would likely convict Owner of murder, whereas a jury of 
Asians would probably acquit. Once again, this is not a case for formal 
professional guidelines; it is a case for policy, judgment, and a prosecutor's 
personal ethics and integrity. 
G. OVERCHARGING 
The practice by some prosecutors of "overcharging" has been 
criticized as an abuse of the charging function. However, it is not 
completely clear what "overcharging" means, or why the practice is 
illegitimate.93 Proposed Standard 3-5.6(d) is similar to the current 
Standard and states that a "prosecutor should not file ... charges greater 
in number or degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at 
trial and that are necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense or 
deter similar conduct.,,94 Thus, a prosecutor may properly file charges 
when reasonably based on the evidence and when the prosecutor 
believes that such charges are necessary to reflect fairly the seriousness 
of the conduct and to deter similar conduct. The Standard does not bar a 
prosecutor from filing such charges, even if the prosecutor believes that 
such charging provides additional leverage for the prosecutor in plea 
bargaining. Consider the following case: 
Defendant, driving home from work at 6 p.m., passes through a stop 
sign without stopping and strikes a nine-year-old girl and her mother 
while they are crossing the street. The girl is killed instantly and her 
mother is critically injured. The defendant had been drinking, was 
driving with a suspended license, and tread marks suggest that his 
speed at the time of impact exceeded the posted speed limit of thirty 
miles-per-hour by at least ten-to-fifteen miles-per-hour. There are 
several homicide charges available, including criminally negligent 
homicide, manslaughter, and murder. The prosecutor is considering 
whether to include the highest count of murder in deciding to file 
charges based on the theory that the defendant's conduct evinced a 
culpable mental state that was recklessly indifferent to human life. 
Would a charge of murder be an "overcharge"? Does the evidence 
"reasonably support" a charge of murder? Does the prosecutor believe 
that bringing a murder charge "fairly reflects" the seriousness of the 
offense and may deter future motorists from such conduct? 
The prosecutor's exercise of discretion must take into account a 
range of factors that are enumerated in proposed Standard 3-5.6(a), 
93. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCI10N § 3-3.9 cmt. (3d ed. 1993) 
("Discretion in Selecting the Number and Degree of Charges"). 
94. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCI10N § 3-S.6(d) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
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which a prosecutor may consider in "declining or dismissing" charges.95 
Current Standard 3-3.9(b) includes many of the same factors that a 
prosecutor "may properly consider in exercising his or her discretion. ,,1)6 
Examining the relevant factors listed in the Standards once again 
demonstrates the difficulty of trying to formulate meaningful guidelines 
that could be successfully applied in individual cases, particularly in those 
cases where it must be determined whether a prosecutor has engaged in 
illegitimate charging by filing more or higher charges than necessary. 
Consider the following questions: 
I. Does the p'rosecutor have a "reasonable doubt that the accused is 
in fact gUllty"?97 
2. What is "the extent of the harm caused by the offense"?98 
3. Is there a disproportion in the authorized punishment in relation 
to the offense and the offender?99 
4. Does the prosecutor have a "policy" regarding vehicular 
homicides, and would charging murder undercut the policy "that 
similarly situated persons be treated equally"?J()() 
5. What is the relevance to the exercise of the prosecutor's 
discretion of "the character of the offender or other aspects of 
the offender's situation"?'O' 
Is a murder charge an example of "overcharging"? Arguably, all of 
the above factors are so broadly worded that they could be used by 
different prosecutors both to support and to reject a murder charge. A 
prosecutor could claim that there is no reasonable doubt that the accused 
is guilty of depraved-mind murder; that the harm is very grave; that the 
punishment fits the crime; and that there is no general policy that would 
be undercut by a murder charge. However, the "character of the 
offender" -a nebulous and uncertain factor-may be the most critical 
factor of all. Would the prosecutor be more likely to charge murder if the 
defendant were an illegal immigrant than if the defendant were a judge 
or a highly decorated veteran of the Iraq war? Does the defendant's 
youth, family, or status matter? Once again, the list of factors relevant to 
the exercise of discretion in making the charging decision does not 
appear to raise ethical questions as much as it raises questions of 
practice, policy, and judgment. However, given the opportunity for 
widely different treatment of persons who have committed the same 
crime, should such conduct raise ethical questions? If so, then the 
9S· Id. § 3·s·6(a). 
C)6. STANDARDS FOR CRlM[NAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNcnON § 3-3.9(b) (3d ed. 1993). 
97. STANDARDS FOR CR[M[NAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNcnON § 3-s.6(a)(i) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
98. Id. § 3-s·6(a)(ii). 
99· Id. § 3-s·6(a)(iii). 
[00. Id. § 3-s.6(a)(vii). 
[or. Id. § 3-s.6(a)(x). 
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Standard is inadequate. Perhaps it would be better for the Standard to 
state that even if the charges are reasonably supported by the evidence, 
the prosecutor should not bring them when it reasonably appears that 
they are being brought to gain a tactical advantage, either to induce a 
plea, or to coerce a witness into cooperating with the government. 
H. RELEASE-DISMISSAL CASES 
Both the current Standard 3-3.9(g) and the proposed Standard 3-
S.6( e) address the question of whether and under what circumstances it is 
proper for a prosecutor to condition the dismissal of criminal charges on 
the defendant's promise to relinquish his right to bring a civil action 
against the arresting police officers or other government officials for 
violating his civil rights. 102 There is obviously an element of coercion in 
requiring as a condition of dismissal a promise not to sue, and it may 
reasonably be claimed that such a promise contravenes public policy. 
However, the Supreme Court has upheld such agreements and held them 
not to be per se void as against public policy.I03 The current Standard and 
the proposed Standard both attempt to clarify the question of when a 
prosecutor may dismiss a charge if the defendant promises to release the 
government from civil liability. The first sentence of the proposed 
Standard essentially reiterates the current Standard but changes the 
language to state that "a prosecutor may condition a dismissal ... only if 
the accused has agreed [not to sue],"I'" whereas the current Standard 
states that a prosecutor "should not condition a dismissal ... unless the 
accused has agreed [not to sue)."IOS However, the added sentence in the 
proposed Standard-"[a] prosecutor should not use a civil waiver to 
avoid a bone [sic] fide claim of improper law enforcement,,106 -appears 
to contradict the first sentence or at least to confuse the matter. Consider 
the following case: 
Defendant has been arrested by a Transit Authority Officer for 
disorderly conduct and resisting arrest for engaging in loud and 
profane conduct on a subway platform and for resisting arrest when the 
Officer approached him and tried to get him to desist. Defendant 
appears at his arraignment with a large welt under his eye, and in 
response to the judge's question, the Officer states that the injury 
occurred when Defendant fell and hit his face on a subway bench. 
Defendant's lawyer advises the arraignment prosecutor that the Officer 
102. See id. § 3-s.6(e); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsnCE: PROSECUTION FUNcnON § 3-3.9(g) (3d ed. 
1993)· 
103. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 
104. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNcnON § 3-s.6(e) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
105. STANDARDS FOR CRlMTNAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNcnON § 3-3.9(g) (3d ed. 1993). 
106. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNcnON § 3·s.6(e) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
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and his partner had beaten Defendant at the booking location, and 
when the skeptical prosecutor confronts the Officer, the latter 
responds: "It happened the way I said it did, counsel." Assume 
Defendant, through his lawyer, seeks a dismissal of charges contingent 
upon Defendant's agreement not to bring a civil action against the 
officers or the city. 
Assume the prosecutor believes that Defendant has a "bona fide 
claim of improper law enforcement." What should an ethical prosecutor 
do? Does the Standard tell us? On the one hand, under both the current 
Standard 3-3.9(g) and the proposed Standard 3-5.6( e), "the accused has 
agreed to the action knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily, and such 
waiver is disclosed to the court."I07 The prosecutor, therefore, may accept 
the waiver. On the other hand, new language in Standard 3-5.6( e) states 
that the prosecutor "should not use a civil waiver to avoid a bone [sic] 
fide claim of improper law enforcement," and that the decision not to file 
criminal charges against the defendant "should be made on the merits 
and not for the purpose of obtaining a civil waiver.,,'08 The prosecutor 
faces a dilemma produced by a confusing Standard. The prosecutor could 
decide that there is no merit to the criminal charges, and that, therefore, 
he would be justified in accepting the waiver. But if the prosecutor is 
either uncertain about the validity of the criminal charges or is skeptical 
of the officer's story, is the prosecutor's decision to accept a waiver and 
dismiss the charges made legitimately "on its merits," or is it made 
illegitimately "for the purpose of obtaining a civil waiver"? Under the 
proposed Standard, we cannot know. 
It seems that the intent of the proposed Standard is to allow a 
defendant to initiate a dismissal of charges by agreeing not to sue if the 
charges are dismissed. The prosecutor could then decide to agree to the 
defendant's request if he believes the dismissal and waiver are in the 
public interest. The Standard appears to be intended to bar the 
prosecutor from initiating such a discussion because of its inherently 
coercive nature. If that is the Standard's intent, it should state that 
position explicitly. As presently written, the proposed Standard is 
unclear. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed Standards dealing with the prosecutor's charging 
function and the exercise of charging discretion have made several 
additions to the current Standards. To bring charges, a prosecutor must 
"believe" rather than "know" that the charges are supported by probable 
cause and must have a "reasonable belief' in their continued validity to 
HJ7. [d.; see also STANDARDS FOR CluMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.9(g) (3d ed. 1993). 
lOS. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-s.6(e) (Proposed Revisions 
2009)· 
May 20II] THE CHARGING FUNCTION 
retain those charges for disposition. The proposed Standards, for the first 
time, acknowledge the impact on the charging function of potential 
innocence and the responsibility of a prosecutor when he believes that he 
may be prosecuting an innocent person. The proposed Standards also 
add several new factors to the list of factors relevant to a prosecutor's 
exercise of discretion. 
However, as I have tried to demonstrate with my hypothetical cases, 
the charging function is so complex, and the discretionary process so fact 
specific, that it easily eludes standardized decisionmaking. Requiring a 
prosecutor to believe that a charge is based on probable cause will 
support almost any charging decision; listing without any attempt at 
prioritization numerous discretionary factors will support virtually any 
charging decision not shown to have been made in bad faith, no matter 
how egregious it appears. To be sure, the proposed Standards, as well as 
the current Standards, are a perfectly legitimate attempt to establish 
aspirational rules. Insofar as they may purport to provide meaningful 
guidelines for prosecutors engaged in making charging decisions, the 
Standards do not appear to be relevant or helpful. 
